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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
E. S. WILSON,

Plaintiff, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant.

vs.
WEBER COUNTY, a public corporation
of the State of Utah,
Defendant, Appellant
and Cross-Respondent.

No.
6195

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement submitted by appellant, Weber
County, is substantially correct so far as it goes, and
inasmuch as appellant raises no question as to matters
alleged and not stated, it is adequate to present the
problem raised by appellant's appeal. There is, however, an additional question raised by the cross-appeal
and we must state the facts out of which that question
arises.
The complaint, filed April 4, 1939, set out three
causes of action. The appellant's statement relates only
to the first.
The second cause of action alleged that John Fletcher Scowcroft was at all times therein mentioned the
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executor of the last will and testament of Joseph Scowcroft, Deceased. As such executor, on August 27, 1931,
and at the time of filing the inventory and appraisement in the estate of said decedent, he paid the Weber
County Clerk the sum of nine hundred seventy-seven
dollars ($977.00) pursuant to the requirements of Section 2521, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, now appearing
as Section 28-2-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. The
said sum was paid over to the Weber County Treasurer,
who received, held and used it for the benefit of Weber
County. It is further alleged that nine hundred sixtyseven dollars ($967.00) of said sum is in fact and law
an ad valorem tax unconstitutionally attempted to be
levied and was erroneously, illegally and unconstitutionally collected and received by the County. It is then
alleged that on September 1, 1938, the executor notified
the County Commission that said sum so paid was erroneously and illegally collected and demanded that the
County Commissioners make an order for the refund
thereof, but that the Commission failed and refused so
to do. It is finally alleged that before the bringing of
the action, the claim was assigned to the plaintiff.
The third cause of action is similar to the second.
It alleges a similar payment to the County officers in
the sum of seventy-five dollars ($75.00) on April 4,
1933, by the administrator of the Estate of Sidney 0.
Stevens, Deceased, the illegal character of the collection
upon the part of the County, the demand on March 6,
1939, on the County Commission for an order of refund
as to sixty-five dollars ($65.00) thereof, and the Commission's refusal, and the assignment of the claim to
plaintiff prior to filing the action.
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The complaint prays for judgment for the sums for
which demand was made, with interest from the date
of demand.
To the second and third causes of action the defendant demurred upon the alleged ground that those
causes were barred by Section 104-2-30, Revised Statutes
of Utah, 1933.
The Court sustained the demurrer pleading the
statute of limitations to the second and third causes of
a6tion. The plaintiff elected to stand on the complaint
and refused to plead over, whereupon the Court entered
judgment dismissing the second and third causes of
action, with prejudice. From this portion of the judgment the plaintiff cross-appealed, assigning as error
the sustaining of the demurrers and the judgment of
dismissal with prejudice.

THE QUESTIONS
Only two main questions are involved, but upon
analysis, each in turn presents one or more subdivisions.
In the hope that it may assist the Court, we have attempted to present the questions logically analyzed and
subdivided.
They are:
1. Does respondent's complaint state facts sufficient
in its "first cause of action," to constitute a cause of
action against appellant 1
(a) Is an allegation of payment of the moneys
under protest necessary to a complete and full allegation
of said cause of action Y
4
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(b) Is it necessary to allege the presentation and
rejection of a claim against Weber County pursuant to
the provisions of Section 19-11-10, R. S. U. 1933¥
2. Are respondent's second and third causes of action on their face barred by the pr~visions of Section
104-2-30 R. S. U. 1933~
(a) When does the period of limitation begin to
run on respondent's causes of action~
( 1) Is prior demand a necessary part of respondent's cause of action~
(2) If prior demand is a prerequisite to action,
may a claimant indefinitely delay making demand¥
( 3) If the claimant may not indefinitely postpone the running of the statute by delaying demand,
when will the period begin to run in the absence of a
demand~

THE ARGUMENT
FIRST QuESTION

It seems to us too clear for argument that respondent's first cause of action states facts sufficient to entitle him to recover the tax which was admittedly collected erronsously, illegally and in violation of our
constitution.
This Court held in Smith vs. Carbon County, 90
Utah 560, 63 Pac. 2d 259, 108 A. L. R. 513 (second appeal
in 95 Utah 360, 81 Pac. 2d 370), that ten dollars ($10.00)
of the so-called ''inventory filing fee'' was in fact a fee,
but (and we quote from the second opinion), "this Court
5
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held that fees in excess of the m.mimum provided by
statute for services in probate and guardianship proceedings ... are taxes within the operation of restrictions imposed by the State constitution ... '' The entire
tax was held unconstitutional, and the statute upon which
such tax was based was held totally void. No portion
of the tax was held valid. As the Court pointed out, the
Legislature's characterization of the tax as a: fee did not
affect its true nature.
The case of Neilson vs. San Pete County, 40 Utah
560, 123 Pac. 334, is exactly in point. It held that an
allegation of payment under protest pursuant to Section SQ-11-11, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933 (formerly
Section 2684, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907) is not necessary to state a cause of action under Section 80-10-17,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933 (formerly Section 2642,
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907), for recovery of taxes
illegally collected and received by a county.
In the San Pete County case, this Court further held
that a cause of action to recover a tax illegally collected
is not a claim which must be itemized, verified, presented, and if refused, action brought thereon under the
requirements of Sections 19-11-10 and 19-11-12, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933. (Formerly Sections 531 and
533 Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907), and an allegation
of compliance with such sections is unnecessary in stating a cause of action under Section 80-10-17 Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933. It is perhaps well here to observe that Weber County did not plead Sections 19-11-10
and 12 in bar.
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The Respondent's complaint was modeled after the
complaint considered in the San Pete County case,
which was there held to state a cause of action, and contains every allegation contained in the adjudicated
pleading. We respectfully submit that the San Pete
case is not distinguishable from this one, when this
one is considered in the light of the Carbon County cases,
supra, and that Respondent's complaint states facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
In closing this section, perhaps the Court's attention should be called to the fact that only the general
demurrer to the first cause of action is before this
Court, as Appellant has not assigned as error the overruling of the general demurrers to the 2nd and 3rd
causes of action.
SEcOND QuESTION

The Respondent and Cross-Appellant's action was
begun within four years of the payment alleged in the
first, and after four but within eight years of the payments alleged in the second and third causes of action.
As the limitation pleaded by the Appellant (section 1042-30, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933) prescribes a four
year period, the question of the Bar of the Statute of
Limitations is involved only in the second and third
causes of action.
It is the contention of Respondent and Cross-Appellant that prior demand upon the County Commissioners
is a necessary part of his cause of action and a prerequisite to the commencement of suit, and that the
Statute does not start to run until demand. It is con-

7
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ceded, however, that the Statute may not be defeated
by an indefinite delay in presenting a demand, and
that the Statute starts to run, even without demand,
within a reasotw.ble time after demt.md might have been
made, i. e. within a reasonable time after payment. A
reasonable time in such a situation, and in the absence
of special or unusual circumstances, has been uniformly
determined by the Courts to be a period equal to that of
the limitation applicable. Thus, where demand is a
prerequisite, an action is brought in time if demand is
made and the action filed within double the period of
the limitation after demand might first have been made
-in this case, within eight years.
With these rules the Respondent has complied.
Neilson vs. San Pete County, supra, holds definitely
that prior demand is an integral part of the cause of
action, and a prerequisite to suit in a case such as this.
This Court there said:
''No doubt the taxpayer must, in some form
notify the Board of County Commissioners that
the County had no authority to collect the tax in
question, and that it has no right to retain the
same, and hence he demands or requests that the
tax be refunded to him."-Utah Report, page 569.
And again:
''But we need not go, nor do we go, to the
extent of holding in this case that taxes coming
within the preview of section 2642 may be recovered back without first making a demand therefor upon the County Commissioners. We think
that the Statute implies such a demand from the
fact that it authorizes the Board of Commissioners to order the refunding of the taxes.'' (Italics
supplied.)-Utah Report, page 572.
8
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Note also that the Court allowed legal interest, not
from the date of payment, but only from the date of de·
mand. If the caus~ of action had accrued as of the date
of payment, interest would, of course, have been allowed
from that time. Clearly the Court considered that the
cause did not accrue until demand.
Moreover, the Court has stated that point to have
been adjudicated in the way Cross-Appellant contends
for. At the time Neilson v. San Pete County was decided,
this Court itself prepared the syllabi for its cases pursuant to Article VIII, Section 26 of the Constitution directing the Court ''to prepare a syllabus of all the
points adjudicated in each case" (Italics supplied).
Here is what the Court says (in its 8th Syllabus) was
adjudicated by that case:
''A taxpayer who pays taxes illegally collected within Compiled Laws, 1907, Section 2642,
authorizing a refund of taxes illegally collected,
must notify the Board of County Commissioners
that the County receiving the taxes has no authority to collect them nor right to retain them, and
must demand a refund thereof, and on such a
demand the Commissioners must adjust the matter and order a refund." (Italics again supplied.)
In that case the Court reserved the question of
whether the action must be commenced within four years
from date of payment or within four years from date
of demand. But we submit that, a demand being a part
of the cause of action under the decisions, the general
rule is that the Statute runs from demand, or, in the
absence of demand, from a reasonable time after pay·
ment within which to made demand.
9
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The Utah Statute here involved makes this eveu
clearer than the ordinary law. It reads (Section 104-230, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933):
''An action for relief not otherwise provided
for must be c.ommenced within four years after
the cause of action shall have accrued.'' (Italics
supplied.)
As the cause of action is not complete until demand,
the Statute by its terms does not start until then.
The applicable rule is succinctly stated in Bancroft's Code Pleading, Practic~ and Remedies, Ten Year
Supplement, Volume 1, pages 1475-6:
"Where a demand is necessary before a cause
of action arises, the Statute does not begin to run
until such demand is made, provided, however,
that the demand or other necessary condition be
made or performed within a reasonable time,
generally regarded as coincident with the period
of limitation.. ''
And it is said in Bancroft's Code Practice and
Remedies, Volume 1, page 515, (Section 323),
"* * * a right of action may be barred before it
has ever accrued, as in case of an obligation maturing only after demand where no demand has ever
been made. The Statute in such case would commence to run upon the expiration of a reasonable
time within which demand should have been
made." (Citing cases. The italics are supplied.)
Again, as to the time of making the demand, it is
said in 37 C. J. 965,
"Again, it is held that, where there is nothing
to indicate an expectation that a demand is to
be made quickly, or that the parties contemplate
10
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an indefinite delay, the time limited for bringing the action should be treated as the time within
which the demand should be made, at the expiration of which the Statute will begin to run
* * * the demand being presumed to have been
made at that time, and this has been declared to
be the view adopted by the majority of the Courts
and in the better considered cases.''
Numerous decisions are cited in support of the text.
Moreover, as late as March of this year this Court,
in a well reasoned decision (the opinion by Mr. Justice
Wolfe) held that, while ordinarily a cause of action for
a debt accrues and the Statute begins to run when the
debt is due and payable, still, when some controlling
Statute provides that an additional thing be done before action may be brought, the Statute does not begin
to run until the time when the additional thing has
been done and the action may be maintained. The case
is
State Tax Commission vs. Spanish Fork
-Utah-, 100 Pac. 2nd 575.
The Court there held that, where a taxpayer fails
to make a return and pay sales tax due the State, the
Tax Commission must make a return for him, and assess
the tax in administrative proceedings before it may
maintain an action to collect the same, even though the
tax was, under the law, due and payable years before.
The Court then held, as a corollary to the above rule,
that the Statute of Limitations did not begin to run
until after the Tax Commission had filed the return
and made the assessment.
11
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It is to be twted that ·m that case a period lot1-ger
than the Statute had run as to a large portion of the
claim (which was a series of monthly accumulations)
before the Tax return was evet,. f'iled. And still this
Court permitted the plaintiff to recover.
We submit that the case is exactly in point, and is
controlling here in favor of this plaintiff's contention.
One of the best discussions we have found of the
theory behind the cases on this subject is contained In
the editorial comment in an annotation in
32 L. R. A. (N. S.), page 486 et seq.
The annotator makes a very careful analysis of the
various factual situations, and of the various solutions
which have been presented, and clearly points out the
logical fallacy behind each solution except the one we
urge upon the Court. The logic and justice of the theory
we contend for is there, we think, clearly demonstrated.
We respectfully urge a most _careful reading of that
editorial comment.
Many other Courts have reached the conclusion we
·urge upon this Court. From the decisions, not wishing
to burden the Court, we have tried to extract those cases
only which most exactly duplicate the facts at bar, adding only one or two in closely analagous situations
where the general rules applicable are considered.
The case of
Johnston vs. Keefer,
280 Pac. 324 (Idaho, 1929),
is exactly in point. There the plaintiff had purchased
stock from Defendant on March 1, 1919, on Defendant's
12
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promise to repurchase the stock on demand. No effective demand was made until February, 1926. Upon
refusal of the demand, the action was filed in August
of 1926 to recover the purchase price. A four year
Statute of Limitations was pleaded in bar. The Idaho
Court held that the action was begun in time, as the
Statute did not begin to run until March 1, 1923. In
disposing of the issue thus raised, the Court said (page
325, et seq.) :
"It has come to be a quite general rule that,
if an act on the part of a creditor, such as a demand or notice, be necessary as a condition precedent to his cause of action, such demand must be
made within a reasonable time; the theory being
that one in whose favor such a liability exists
cannot defeat the purpose of the statute by an
unreasonable delay in the making of the demand,
and that a reasonable time within which to make
demand is, by analogy, the period which is fixed
by the statute of limitations.
"It has been been held that, when no time is
fixed for the making of a demand, it will be presumed to have been made in a reasonable time, or
at the expiration of the period within which the
statute would have run upon the claim if it had
been due from its date, and the statute is then set
in motion. 25 Cyc. 1207, 1208; 1 Wood on Limitations (4th Ed.) p. 617; Keithler v. Foster, 22
Ohio St. 27; 17 R. C. L. p. 757; Emerson v. North
America Transp. & T. Co., 303 Ill. 282, 135 N.
E. 497, 23 A. L. R. 1, 6; Thompson v. Whitaker
Iron Co., 41 W. Va. 574, 23 S. E. 795 ; Smith v.
Smith, 91 Mich. 7, 51 N. W. 694; Massie v. Byrd,
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87 Ala. 672, 6 So. 145; Daugherty v. Wheeler, 125
Ind. 421, 25 N. E. 542.
"(5, 6) If it were accepted as the rule absolute
that a 'reasonable time' for making demand is
in all cases the period fixed by the statute for the
bringing of an action on the claim or liabilityand the rule is by no means inflexible-it becomes
apparent that the instant action was commenced
in time, taking into consideration the presumption of a demand within the statutory period.
The statute of limitations involved is C. S. Section 6610, prescribing a four-year period for the
commencement of 'an action upon a contract,
obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writing.' The contract was entered into
March 1, 1919, and, applying a four-year period
as a reasonable time within which to make demand for its performance, that period expired
March 1, 1923, immediately after which the statute
would begin to run against the action, requiring
it to be instituted by March 1, 1927. The action
was commenced in August, 1926, thus bringing
it within the time allowed under the application
of the rule above referred to.''
In the case of

Espanda vs. Ogden State Bank
75 Utah 117, 283 Pac. 729,
decided in 1929, this Court announced a rule which, like
the rule announced in State Tax Commission vs. Spanish
Fork, supra, goes even farther than it is necessary to
go in holding that plaintiff's action here is timely. That
was an action upon a certificate of deposit issued in
1912, and payable on presentation twelve months from
date. No demand was made until a few days before the
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suit was brought on August 3, 1927. The Court, choosing to base its decision equally on two grounds (the
second of which was the lack of a Statute applicable to
a bank), said,
"The defendant's plea of the Statute of limitations must also fail. The plaintiff had no cause
of action against the defendant until he demanded
payment of the certificate, and hence the Statute
of limitations did not begin to run until that
date.''
The case of:
Andrews vs. Andrews, Admr.
212 N. W. 408, 51 A. L. R.
542 (Minn. 1927),
is in point. It was a suit on a note, dated in 1905, and
payable on actual demand. No demand was made until
after the maker's death in 1924, when a claim was filed,
and suit brought upon its rejection. The administrator
pleaded a six year Statute in bar, and the trial Court
submitted the case to the jury under an instruction to
find for the plaintiff if it found that a reasonable time
within which to demand payment had not expired more
than six years prior to the maker's death. The Supreme
Court of Minnesota approved this action, holding that
the lapse of a reasonable time for making demand merely
starts the Statute runing from the date on which a
reasonable time terminates.
Other cases exactly in point, and adopting the
theory here contended for are:
Daugherty vs. Wheeler
25 N. E. 542 (Ind.)

15
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Keither vs. Foster
22 Ohio State Reports 27
Thompson vs. Whitaker Iron Company
23 S. E. 795 (W.Va.)
Dean vs. Iowa-Des Moines National Bank &
Trust Co. 290 N. W. 664, 128 A. L. R. 137 (Iowa,
1940)
O'Hair vs. United States Fidelity & Guarantee
Co. 49 Pac. 2nd, 1129 (California District Court
of Appeal First District 1935. Hearing denied by
Supreme Court November 29, 1935).
Additional cases treating of the general subject are :
Williams vs. Bergin
47 Pac. 877 (California)
County of San Luis Obispo vs. Gage
73 Pac. 174.
Spencer vs. City of Los Angeles
179 Pac. 163.
West Texas Utilities vs. Ellis.
102 S. W. 2nd 234 (Texas 1937)
Before we leave this part of our Brief perhaps we
should point out that if it be contended that under the
doctrine announced in the State Tax Commission case,
supra, the running of the Statute may be indefinitely delayed, the answer is, as was suggested by the Court
there, that the obligor may at any time take steps to
determine his obligation either by paying the obligation
if it is admitted or by bringing an action under the
provisions of Section 104-54-14 ~vised Statutes of
Utah, 1933, just as the tax payer in the Tax Commission case could have filed his return and thus started
the Statute running.
16
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However, it is not necessary that the Court here
apply as liberal a rule as that one announced in the Tax
Commission case and in the Ogden State Bank case,
supra, because the plaintiff's action was here brought
within four years after the lapse of a reasonable time
for the presentation of his claim, as a reasonable time
is determined in the ordinary case by the authorities
hereinbefore cited.
In this case it may also be fairly said that the
plaintiff here had a very reasonable and just excuse for
delay in niaking his demand for the reason that until
the Smith vs. Carbon County cases, supra, were decided
by this Court, he, with almost everyone else in the
State of Utah, was laboring under a mistake as to his
antecedent legal rights in believing that the tax unconstitutionally exacted by the Counties was, in fact,
a valid fee for services rendered. Certainly it hardly
seems equitable to allow the Counties, as sub-divisions
of the State, unconstitutionally to extract monies from
their citizens and then, because it has succeeded in holding its ill gotten gains for a period of four years, to deny
the citizens a remedy to recover that which is lawfully
their own. Many Counties have, since the Smith vs.
Carbon County cases, been voluntarily paying claims
of the type here contested by the defendant Weber
County. We think Weber County should be compelled
to pay all three of the plaintiff's claims.
For the reasons stated it is respectfully submitted
that the trial Court did not err in overruling defendant's demurrers to plaintiff's first cause of action and
in rendering judgment upon that cause in favor of
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plaintiff and that the plaintiff's first cause of action
does state facts sufficient to justify the relief granted.
It is further respectfully submitted that the trial Court
did err in holding that plaintiff's second and third
causes of action were barred by the provisions of Section 104-2-30 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and in
entering judgment dismissing said cause of action and
that this Court should affirm the lower Court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff and should reverse its
judgment dismissing plaintiff's second and third causes
of action and remand the case with instructions to take
appropriate procedure upon plaintiff's second and third
causes af action.
Respectfully submitted,
THATCHER & YouNG,
Attorneys for E. B. Wilson,
Plaintiff.
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